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AGENT-CAUSATION AND CONTROL
David Widerker

In this article, I consider a certain libertarian theory of free will which I call
"Strong Agent-Causal Libertarianism". Central to it is the thesis that, if
there is such a thing as agent-causation, then one can show that, as a matter
conceptual necessity, agent-causal acts are within the agent's control. I first
examine a recent attempt to establish this thesis by Timothy O'Connor and
argue that it does not succeed. I then consider another defense of it which I
also find wanting.

Introduction
Libertarians typically believe that some of the actions we perform are free.
By 'free action' they do not just mean a nomically undetermined event
that might not have occurred, like, for example, the random emission of a
subatomic particle by a decaying atom. Rather, they conceive of a free
action as an occurrence the agent had control over; one that was up to the
agent not to perform. Hence, they construe the above thesis as follows:
(L) Some of the actions we perform are free, that is, within our control in the sense that it was within our power not to perform them.
(Unless specified otherwise, I shall henceforth use 'control' in just this
sense.) An important issue among libertarians is how to treat this belief
epistemically. Some libertarians (henceforth "Moderate Libertarians")
realize that they cannot prove its truth. They cannot prove that the world
is not deterministic. Nor can they rule out the possibility that what they
consider to be a free action is in fact a random occurrence merely accompanied by the belief that this occurrence is up to the agent.! Still, they
consider themselves justified in holding L as long as they have not been
given a good reason to the contrary. Other libertarians (henceforth
"Strong Agent-Causal Libertarians" or "SAC-libertarians" for short) are
more ambitious. They, too, admit that they cannot prove L. However,
they contend that they can do so if there is such a thing as agent-causation, or more specifically, if there are acts that consist in the agent's
agent-causing a certain event. Call such acts' agent-causal events'.
Implied by this claim is a thesis that SAC-libertarians think they can
establish, namely that
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(SAC) Necessarily, an agent-causal event is within the control of its
agent.>
A proof or a plausible argument for SAC would be quite significant. It
would place the libertarian position on a stronger conceptual footing
than is usually granted, dispelling the suspicion many share that libertarians are not able to distinguish an action that is free and up to the
agent from an occurrence that is merely nomically undetermined and
random.
In this article, I wish to provide a critical assessment of SAC-libertarianism. I first examine a recent attempt to establish SAC by Timothy
O'Connor and argue that it does not succeed. I then consider another
defense of SAC which I also find wanting. I conclude my article by tracing the implications of this result for the prospects of providing a plausible account of libertarian freedom.
1. O'Connor's Argument jar SAC

According to the SAC-libertarian, when an agent S performs a free
action, he stands in a direct causal relation to some event E that is a
determinate intention to act in a certain way. The causal relation in question is sui generis in the sense that it cannot be reduced to an event-event
causal relation or to nomic regularity. Building upon this assumption,
O'Connor develops a two-step argument for SAC.' Its first part purports
to show that
(OC1) It is impossible for an agent-causal event to be caused.
Consider a causally complex event of the form
(1) Event A causing event B,
for example, the ringing of the bell causing Jones's waking up. O'Connor
points out that one can cause such an event only indirectly by causing its
first relatum - the ringing of the bell. What now about a causally complex event such as
(2) S's agent-causing E?
Such an event, claims O'Connor, cannot be caused indirectly, as its first
relatum S is not an event but an enduring substance, and it is impossible
to cause an enduring substance. Hence, agent-causings cannot be caused
or have causally sufficient conditions. 4 An agent who agent-causes an
event is, therefore, the true causal originator of it.
Of course, this result does not yet establish SAC. The fact that an
agent-causal event cannot be caused does not automatically imply that it
is within the control of its agent in the sense that it was within the
agent's power not to cause E. O'Connor is well aware of this, and the
second part of his argument for SAC is intended to close this gap. Here
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is what he says:
But now consider an instance of S's causing E. This event is intrinsically a doing, owing to its internal structure (Le., an agent's bearing
a direct causal relation to another event.). Its very nature precludes
the possibility of there being a sufficient causal condition for it (as I
argued earlier), being an event that is the agent's causing the event
internal to it (E). Now the event E is clearly under the control of the
agent, since he caused it (directly). But would it not, then, be perfectly absurd to raise a doubt concerning whether the agent controlled his causing E? Indeed, it seems to me that the question
whether the agent has control over this event is ill framed - it simply is an instance of an agent's exercising direct control over another event. (O'Connor 1995, 186-187.)
As we can see, O'Connor moves from
a. S agent-causes E,
to
b. E is under the control of the agent,
and then to
c. It is absurd to doubt that the agent had control over his
agent-causing E, since his agent-causing E is an instance of S's
exercising direct control over E, and it does not make sense to ask
whether S has control over his controlling of E.
I find this argument puzzling. First, there is a problem in the move from
(b) to (c). O'Connor claims that
(3) If S exercises control over E, then it does not make sense to ask
whether S has control over his controlling of E.
However, (3) seems to be false. For example, we may imagine that S has
control over his saying the word 'nice' in the next moment in the sense
that it is within his power not to say it then. But from this it does not folLow that it does not make sense to ask whether the fact of his having this
power is within his control. Such a question makes perfect sense.
Furthermore, the answer to it is usually negative. For like so many of us,
S may just find himself with having this power without being able to rid
himself of it.
Perhaps O'Connor's reason for thinking that it does not make sense to
ask whether S has control over his controlling E is that such control
involves
(4) S's agent-causing his agent-causing E,
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which on his account is impossible. But even if (4) is impossible, it still
does not follow from this that the question whether S has control over
his controlling of E does not make sense. What does follow is that the
answer to it is NO. Compare that question to the question of whether it
is possible to name the largest integer? That the latter is an impossible
task implies that the answer to this second question is negative, and not
that it does not make sense or that it is ill framed. Thus, (3) turns out to
be false again.
A more serious problem with O'Connor's argument is the move from
(a) to (b). O'Connor justifies it by assuming that
(5) S's agent-causing E is an instance of (or consists in) S's exercising direct control over E.
But how does he know (5)? Why does the fact that an agent stands in a
direct causal relation to an event guarantee that he has control over that
event? Here, O'Connor leaves us completely in the dark. S
We can bring out this weakness of O'Connor's argument also by the
following consideration: Granted that we are careful not to assume (5),
i.e. not to identify S's agent-causing E with his exercising control over E,
what we can plausibly say is that
(6) S exercises control over E by means of his agent-causing E only
if S has control over his agent-causing E (only if it is within S's
power not to agent-cause E),
And now we see that, since S's exercising control over E by means of his
agent-causing E is contingent upon S's having control over his agentcausing E, and since O'Connor has not shown that the latter is the case,
he is not justified in moving from (a) to (b).
2. The Default Argument

Although I believe that O'Connor's argument for SAC is unconvincing, I wish to explore another way in which an SAC-libertarian may
want to defend SAC. He may argue as follows:
Look, you charge me with not having shown that an agent-causal
event is within the agent's control. Fair enough. However, what
you do not seem to realize is that this must be so by default. We
have seen earlier that such an event cannot be caused by anything
else. Furthermore, it also can't be a chance occurrence. If I cause
my intention to raise my arm, then obviously this occurrence is not
something I find myself with, or that happens to me out of the
blue. Thus, it does not occur at random. Hence, by default it must
be in my control, as the only two reasons for this not being so do
not obtain.
Let us call this argument "The Default Argument". This seems to me to
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be the strongest argument that the SAC-libertarian can provide for his
position. And the question arises whether it is sound? I shall now argue
that it is not. First, I would like to show that its premises do not entail its
conclusion.
The SAC-libertarian reasons that an agent-causal event must be in the
agent's control, as the only two scenarios in which this might not be the
case - one in which it is caused or one in which it occurs randomly turn out to be incoherent. By causation he understands a sui generis relation between two events or between an agent and an event that cannot
be reduced to nomic regularity.6 There is, however, a further type of scenario in which an agent presumably lacks control over an agent-causal
event which the SAC-theorist also needs to rule out as impossible in
order for the Default Argument to succeed; a scenario in which there
obtains for an agent-causal event a nomically sufficient condition.
Suppose that there were a law of nature to the effect that the obtaining
of antecedent conditions of a certain type F would be always followed
by the occurrence of a certain type of agent-causal event. If that were the
case, then if conditions of the said type were to obtain, then a certain
agent-causal event would become inevitable. Its inevitability would not
be due to its being caused, as, consistent with the SAC-theorist's view,
causation does not reduce to nomic regularity. Rather it would be due to
(i) the fact that its occurrence would be entailed by the conjunction consisting of the relevant law of nature and the relevant antecedent condition, and (ii) the fact that the agent would not have control over this conjunction (once the said antecedent condition occurred). 7
Situations in which there obtains prior to the occurrence of an agentcausal event a logically or metaphysically sufficient condition for it pose a
further difficulty for the Default Argument. A case in point is a scenario
in which an essentially omniscient God forebelieves at time TD that an
agent-causal event Z will occur at time TID. (Hence, the fact that God
forebelieves at TD that Z occurs at TID constitutes a logically or metaphysically sufficient condition for the occurrence of Z at TID.) Such a
scenario seems perfectly compatible with the agent-causal event in question being both uncaused and non-random. But, as shown by a wellknown argument against human freedom from divine foreknowledge,
in the scenario in question the occurrence of that event is unavoidable. 8
The conclusion that emerges from the above considerations is that,
although one might agree with the SAC-libertarian that
(OCI) It is impossible for an agent-causal event to be caused,
one need not grant that
(OCI') It is impossible for an agent-causal event to have a nomically (or metaphysically) sufficient condition that occurs prior to that
event.
It is this latter thesis that the SAC-libertarian needs to prove in order for

the Default Argument to go through - in order to convince us that, as a
matter of conceptual necessity, agent-causal-events are within the
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agent's control. And this he has not done. Note that it is not open to the
SAC-libertarian to counter this objection by insisting that the possibility
of an agent-causal event having a nomically (or metaphysically) sufficient condition is ruled out by the following assumption explicative of
the notion of agent-causation:
(C) If S agent-caused E, then it was within S's power not to agentcause E.
For by assuming C, which is equivalent to SAC, he would render his
attempt to prove SAC question begging.9
3. A Further Difficulty

What about the SAC-libertarian's more specific claim OCl? So far I have
not questioned it. However, it also seems to me unfounded. O'Connor's
argument for it relies heavily on the assumption that
(OC2) One can cause a causally complex event only indirectly by
causing its first relatum.
Unlike O'Connor, I reject this assumption and claim that we have no
good reason to think that it holds for agent-causal events. If at all, it only
holds for causally complex events such as event A causing event B.
To see this, consider again the agent-causal event
(2) S's agent-causing E.
When this event occurs, the individual S acquires the property of agentcausing E. Now an individual existing at time T may acquire a property
it does not have at T at a later time. It may acquire it either spontaneously or by being caused to have it. The same, however, is not true of an
event. An event, not being an enduring object, cannot acquire a (genuine) property it lacks at a time later than the time at which it occurred,
i.e. later than the time at which it was wholly present.lO The only way in
which an event can come to have a (genuine) property is either by occurring (spontaneously or in a causal way) with that property, or by occurring in circumstances in which it acquires the said property in virtue of
the properties it has and those of the circumstances. So, for instance, if
the event of flipping the switch occurs in the right sort of circumstances,
it acquires the property of causing the event of the light's going on.
Here, in my view, lies the reason why O'Connor's assumption OC2
does not hold for agent-causal events. Such events (unlike event-event
causings) consist in an individual or a substance exemplifying a property.
And it is simply not true that the only way in which an individual can
come to have a property P is either by coming to exist with that property,
or by coming to exist in circumstances in which it acquires the said
property in virtue of the properties it has and those of the circumstances.
Another, in fact, most common way in which an individual may acquire
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a property is, when in a situation in which the individual already exists,
something causes it to have the property - that something being a
change in the individual itself or a change in some other substance. In
this regard, I do not see any difference between the individual acquiring
the property of agent-causing E or any other property.
Again, it is not open to the SAC-libertarian to try meet this objection
by arguing that the possibility I am pointing to - the possibility of something causing S to have the property of agent-causing E does not exist,
since the notion of S's agent-causing E entails that S has it within his
power not to agent-cause E. For, as pointed out earlier, the SAC-libertarian's argument for SAC would then become question begging."
I have argued above that we have no good reason to accept
O'Connor's assumption OC2, and consequently, we have no good reason to accept his argument for his claim that
(OCl) It is impossible for an agent-causal event to be caused.
I shall now show that we also have good reasons to reject that argument.
The argument rests on the following two assumptions:
m. One can cause a causally complex event such as S's agent-causing E only indirectly by causing its first relatum - S,
n. It is impossible to cause S, since S is an enduring substance.
Both these assumptions seem to me questionable. Consider (n). Why is it
not possible to cause S? Since by 'causing' O'Connor means 'producing'l2, causing S certainly is possible. For example, it is certainly possible
for God to produce, or to create S. In response, O'Connor might argue
that strictly speaking what God causes when He creates S is not the individual S, but the event of S's coming into existence. But drawing this distinction between causing S and causing S's coming into existence,
though it may save (n) from the above objection, merely shifts the objection onto (m). For now it seems possible for God to bring about S's
agent-causing E not in the way specified in (m) - without causing the
individual S. I.e., by either causing S to come into existence with the
property of agent-causing E, or by causing S to come into existence in
circumstances (and with properties) such that S would agent-cause E in
those circumstances.
Assumption (m) may be objected to also on independent grounds.
Contrary to what it states, causing
(2) S's agent-causing E at T
does not require one to cause it indirectly by causing S. Causing (2) does
not require one to cause S at all, since S's existence at T may be guaranteed independently by some other factor. Assuming that S existed prior
to T, S's existence at T may be guaranteed by God (not necessarily by
His creating or recreating S at T, but by ensuring that a previously exist-
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ing S will continue to exist at T.) Alternatively, a naturalist countenancing an ontology including substances may hold that S's existence at T is
guaranteed by virtue of its being a substance and the way our universe
is. That is, he may hold that our world is such that, if a substance exists
prior to T, then, unless a necessary condition for its continued existence
is missing, it will continue to exist on its own. 13
We may expose the fallacy underlying O'Connor's (m) also in the following way: causing S to acquire at T the property of agent-causing E
presupposes the existence of S at T. But it does not presuppose causing
the existence of S at T. Note that, in this regard, there does not seem to
be any difference between causing S to acquire the property of agentcausing E and causing S to have any other property. Thus, to cause S to
feel pain at T, I certainly do not have to cause S to exist at T. In the same
way, I do not have to cause S to exist at T in order to cause S to acquire
at T the property of agent-causing E.

4. Another Sense of Control
The failure of the SAC-theorist to establish OC1 prevents him from
raising the following important objection to my criticism of his position.
He might claim that by 'control' in L and SAC he did not mean' control'
in the sense of the agent having it within his power to avoid acting as he
did. Rather, he meant' control' in the sense of an agent performing an act
all his own. (An act that the agent performs on his own is one that is neither caused, nor nomically determined, nor random.) In other words, he
might claim that the way he understood SAC is this:
(SAC1) Necessarily, an agent-causal event is within the agent's
control in the sense of being an act that the agent performs on his

own.
Pursuing this line, the SAC-theorist might argue that in that case my
earlier objections to SAC-libertarianism (those stated in sections 1
and 2) do not apply, being based on an incorrect understanding
'control'.14;ls For instance, one objection that would not apply is the
one I raised (in sec. 1) against O'Connor's claim that
(3) If S exercises control over E, then it does not make sense to ask
whether S has control over his controlling of E.
For if by'S exercises control over E' we mean that S causes E on his own,
then indeed it does not make sense to ask whether "S's causing E on his
own" is something that S brings about on his own. Thus, on the "acting
on his own" reading of 'control' (3) turns out to be true. 16 Furthermore, it
would seem that my objection to the Default Argument also does not
apply. The objection shows that the argument does not rule out the possibility of an agent-causal event being unavoidable - it does not rule out the
possibility that an agent might lack control over an agent-causal event in
the "avoidability" sense of 'control'. But it does not show that this is the
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case when 'control' is understood in the "acting on his own" sense.
Now, however, this way out is not available to the SAC-theorist. For
if he has not shown that an agent-causal event cannot be caused, then,
obviously, he has not succeeded in establishing SACl. Note that this
conclusion also follows from fact that the SAC-libertarian has not ruled
out the possibility of there being a nomically sufficient condition for an
agent-causal event. For if the latter is a possibility, then someone who
has it within his power to bring about such a condition would also be
able to bring about the occurrence of an agent-causal event. Such a consequence would certainly be in contradiction with SAC1, as it entails
that the occurrence of an agent-causal event may be explained by factors
external to the agent.

Conclusion
The conclusion that emerges is that the SAC-libertarian is unable to
establish the SAC-thesis to the effect that agent-causal events (acts) are
vJ'ithin the agent's control. Hence, he also cannot prove the reality of free
actions even on the assumption of agent-causation. This point raises the
more general question of whether the notion of a free action can be more
adequately captured by a libertarian theory other than SAC-libertarianism? For example, a theory that defines such an action as consisting in
the agent's causing an event, provided that his causing the event is
either nomically undetermined or uncaused. Or, a theory such as Simple
Indeterminism, for which a free action either is, or originates in, a
causally or nomically undetermined simple mental action such as a
forming of an intention, an undertaking, a volition, etc. Or perhaps, as
the Moderate Libertarian maintains, a free action is an action that the
agent had it within his power not to perform, where this claim (i) entails
that such an action is nomically undetermined, and (ii) the notion of
power in question is sui generis in the sense that it is not reducible to
causal possibility or other modal notions?17 These are important quesHons, which I hope to pursue at another time. 'S
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NOTES
1. Although for a Moderate Libertarian a free action either is, or originates in, a simple mental action that is within the agent's control (a forming
of an intention, a choice, an undertaking, etc), he cannot rule out the possibility that what he believes is an instance of a free action might turn out to
be a mere chance occurrence consisting in the agent's passively acquiring a
certain intention together with the (false) belief that he could have formed a
different intention. On the notion of passively acquiring an intention, see
Mele 1992, chapter 12, and Adams and Mele 1989, 521-522.
2. Strong Agent-Causal Libertarianism ought to be distinguished from
other forms of Agent-Causal Libertarianism such as Moderate Agent-Causal
Libertarianism and Reidian Agent-Causal Libertarianism. Proponents of
these other positions also admit that they cannot prove L. However, for
Reidian Agent-Causal Libertarians, SAC turns out to be true by definition,
since part of their conception of agent-causation is that, if an agent causes a
certain event, he also has the power not to cause that event (Rowe 1991,
chapter 4). Moderate Agent-Causal Libertarians, on the other hand, deny
that a thesis such as SAC is necessarily true. For them an agent-causal event
might be caused or nomically determined, and thus might not be within the
agent's control. They require, however, that an agent-causal event that constitutes a free act must be within the agent's control. A philosopher who
espouses this type of libertarianism is Richard Taylor. See Taylor 1966, chap.
8 and 9, esp. pp. 114-115.
3. See O'Connor 1995, 184-187, esp. pp.186-187. O'Connor develops this
argument in the context of trying to rebut Chisholm's claim that control over
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an agent-causal event requires an infinite regress of agent-causings. See
Chisholm 1991, 40. For a shorter version of O'Connor's argument, see
O'Connor 1996, 146-147.
4. See O'Connor 1995, 186; and O'Connor 1996, 147.
5. For a similar worry, see Ginet 1995,91.
6. See O'Connor 1995,175, and O'Connor 2000,68.
7. The rule of inference leading to the inevitability of the agent-causal
event is this: whatever follows logically from something that is inevitable for
the agent, is also inevitable for the agent. Note that I am assuming here a
non-Humean, necessitarian account of laws of nature.
8. This may be shown as follows: The assumption of S's having it within his power (at T9) not to agent-cause Eat TlO requires that there is possible
world W' which shares its past up until T9 with tll.e real world, and at which
S does not agent-cause E at no. But since that past includes the state of
affairs of God's forebelieving at TO that S agent-causes E at no, and since
that state of affairs entails S's agent-causing Eat T10, it follows that a world
such as W' does not exist. For other, more elaborated, versions of the argument against human freedom from divine foreknowledge and their discussion, see Hasker 1989, chap. 4; and the articles in Fischer 1989.
9. Though a SAC-libertarian like O'Connor takes C to be part of the
very notion of agent-causation (O'Connor 1995, 176-177; 1996, 145), it is
quite clear that ll.e also thinks he can provide an independent argument for
SAC; one that is meant to be based only on (i) the assumption that agentcausation is a sui-generis causal relation obtaining between an agent and an
event, and (ii) on some general features of the causal relation. (See O'Connor
1995,186-187; and O'Connor 1996,147-148.)
10. I say "genuine property" because an event can, after it occurs,
acquire a non-genuine or Cambridge property. For example, if, in December
2000, I mention the event of Abraham Lincoln's death (in 1865), then that
event can be said to acquire the Cambridge property of P: being mentioned
by me in December 2000, that is, much later after it occurred. Another way
of dealing with Cambridge properties is to dispense with them altogether.
The truth-conditions of a sentence like 'Lincoln's death was mentioned by
David in December 2000' could be stated in terms of: David exemplifies in
December 2000 the property of mentioning Lincoln's death. In other words,
by accepting the truth of that sentence one need not be ontologically committed to properties like P. Thanks to Bob Kane for drawing my attention to
the need to accommodate the case of Cambridge properties.
11. Carl Ginet and William Hasker are also skeptical about the cogency
of O'Connor's contention that agent-causal events cannot be caused (OC2).
See Hasker 2001, 106-7; and Ginet 1997, 92-93. Hasker argues against it by
way of counterexample. Ginet argues that, given the prima facie difference
between event-event causings and agent-causings, we have no reason to
treat them alike, and hence have no reason to accept OC2. (See also
Hendrickson 2002, 47-49, who takes the same position as Ginet.) The argument against OC2 in the text goes deeper tracing the asymmetry between
the two types of causings to an ontological difference between individuals
and events.
12. See O'Connor 1995, 175; and O'Connor 2000,68.
13. Note that theists may also avail themselves of this assumption,
except that they will add that God made the universe that way.
14. This reply is based on the controversial assumption that one can
indeed pry apart the two senses of controL I.e., that the fact that an agent
acted on his own does not entail it was within his power to avoid acting as
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he did. For more on this issue, see Frankfurt 1969; Widerker 1995; Ginet
1996, Kane 1996, 142-3; Mele and Robb 1998; and Pereboom 2001, chap. 1.
For a collection of articles devoted specifically to this issue, see Widerker
and Mckenna forthcoming.
15. I do not mean to attribute this reply to O'Connor, but consider it only
as a reply an SAC-libertarian may (in principle) avail himself of.
16. My thanks to David Gottlieb for stressing this point.
17. That this power is sui generis has been admirably defended by
Richard Taylor in (Taylor, 1966, chap.4).
18. I would like to thank Jerome Gellman, David Gottlieb, Bob Kane,
Charlotte Katzoff, Yakir Levin, Al Mele, Bill Rowe, and most especially Ira
Schnall and the referees for Faith and Philosophy, for their excellent comments
on an earlier draft of this paper.

